Publications
with Ben Hansen, Kendall Houghton, & Keaton Miller
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, forthcoming
We study how prices respond when a 25% gross receipts tax remitted by cannabis manufacturers was eliminated in Washington state and the retail excise tax was simultaneously increased from 25% to 37%. Standard theory suggests that this change should have increased welfare for manufacturers, retailers, and consumers; instead, our analysis shows that the reform unexpectedly shifted benefits toward manufacturers at the expense of retailers and consumers, who faced higher tax-inclusive prices post-reform. We hypothesize that this outcome was driven by behavioral factors such as anchoring and loss aversion. Our findings add to a growing body of evidence that tax reforms can affect market outcomes in ways not predicted by standard economic models, offering a cautionary lesson for policymakers considering similar reforms.
National Tax Journal, 2025
We study grandparents claiming grandchildren on tax returns as dependents and for the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Grandparents claimed roughly 2.1 million children as dependents on federal income tax returns for 2018. Grandparent-headed households with a dependent child were more likely to claim the CTC and EITC than parent-headed households with a dependent child. The prevalence of grandparents claiming grandchildren on tax returns has declined sharply over time. We explore how the interaction of tax rules with family living arrangements and income might explain these patterns.
with Ben Hansen & Keaton Miller
Journal of Public Economics, 2022
We quantify the effects of a gross receipts tax (GRT) on vertical integration for the first time. We use data from the Washington state recreational cannabis industry, which has numerous advantages including a clean natural experiment: a 25% GRT imposed on cannabis firms was subsequently replaced by an excise tax at retail. We find the short-run elasticity of vertical integration with respect to the intermediate good net-of-tax rate is −0.15 and the long-run elasticity is about twice as large. We find these incentives lead to large output losses – production increases by 23 percent when the GRT is eliminated.
with Ben Hansen & Keaton Miller
Journal of Public Economics, 2020
Marijuana is partially prohibited: though banned federally, it is available to 1 in 4 U.S. adults under state statutes. We measure the size of the interstate trade generated by state-level differences in legal status with a natural experiment: Oregon allowed stores to sell marijuana for recreational use on October 1, 2015, next to Washington where stores had been selling recreational marijuana since July 2014. Using administrative data covering the universe of Washington's sales and a differences-in-discontinuities approach, we find retailers along the Oregon border experienced a 36% decline in sales immediately after Oregon's market opened. We investigate the home location of recent online reviewers of marijuana retailers and find similar cross-border patterns. By the end of Washington's 2018 fiscal year, our results imply that Washington had earned between $44 million and $75 million in tax revenue from cross-border shoppers. These cross-border incentives may create a “race to legalize.”
with Ben Hansen, Keaton Miller & Boyoung Seo
National Tax Journal, 2020
Cannabis is legal to purchase for over 28 percent of U.S. citizens. A central argument used in public campaigns for cannabis legalization has focused on the tax revenue that legal cannabis markets could generate. Recently, some policy makers and politicians have debated switching from traditional ad valorem taxes to taxes on potency, aiming to reduce the potential externalities associated with highly potent products. In this paper, we construct a theoretical model to predict the implications of a potency-based tax in an environment with market power. We then estimate the demand for cannabis potency based on administrative records of sales and potency from Washington state. We finish by conducting counterfactual analyses comparing revenue and potency outcomes from potency-based taxes versus the traditional price-based taxes.
with Ben Hansen & Keaton Miller
Economic Inquiry, 2020
Over the last few years, marijuana has become legally available for recreational use to roughly a quarter of Americans. Policy makers have long expressed concerns about the substantial external costs of alcohol, and similar costs could come with the liberalization of marijuana policy. Indeed, the fraction of fatal accidents in which at least one driver tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol has increased nationwide by an average of 10% from 2013 to 2016. For Colorado and Washington, both of which legalized marijuana in 2014, these increases were 92% and 28%, respectively. However, identifying a causal effect is difficult due to the presence of significant confounding factors. We test for a causal effect of marijuana legalization on traffic fatalities in Colorado and Washington with a synthetic control approach using records on fatal traffic accidents from 2000 to 2016. We find the synthetic control groups saw similar changes in marijuana-related, alcohol-related, and overall traffic fatality rates despite not legalizing recreational marijuana.
with Joel Slemrod & Hui Shan
Journal of Urban Economics, 2017
This paper estimates the behavioral response to residential real estate transfer taxes by studying notched tax rate changes in Washington D.C., exploiting both a price and time notch as identifying variation. We provide evidence that there is manipulation of the sales price to the lower-tax-rate region around the price notch, and use this manipulation to show that there was significant awareness of the tax changes and the incentives they created. We then construct difference-in-difference estimates to examine whether there is a lock-in effect in the volume of house sales away from the price and time notches; we find no evidence of a lock-in effect in this setting. Taken together, our results suggest that the welfare costs of a state introducing or eliminating a housing transaction tax are small.
with Nicholas Sly
Review of International Economics, 2016
Using a 30-year panel of quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) fluctuations from of a broad set of countries, we demonstrate that the signing of a bilateral tax treaty increases the comovement of treaty partners' business cycles by half a standard deviation. This effect of fiscal policy is as large as the effect of trade linkages on comovement and stronger than the effects of several other common financial and investment linkages. We also show that bilateral tax treaties increase comovement in shocks to nations' GDP trends, demonstrating the permanent effects of coordination on fiscal policy rules. We estimate trend and business cycle components of nations' output series using an unobserved-components model in order to measure comovement between countries and then estimate the impact of tax treaties using generalized estimating equations.
National Tax Journal, 2016
This paper analyzes the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on investment income. Policy-makers have devoted substantial time and resources toward increasing the saving rate of low-income households, yet the EITC provides a substantial disincentive for individuals to save and realize investment income. I find that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax return to saving causes a 3.05 percent increase in investment income. Nearly 40 percent of the decline over the last two decades in the fraction of EITC recipients with savings in income-bearing accounts can be explained by changing EITC incentives.
Journal of Public Economics, 2014
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a central parameter for tax policy debates. This paper shows that mean reversion prevents most estimators employed in the literature from obtaining consistent estimates of the ETI. A new method is proposed that will resolve inconsistency due to mean reversion under testable assumptions regarding the degree of serial correlation in the error term. Using this procedure, I estimate an ETI of 0.858, which is about twice as large as the estimates found in the most frequently cited paper on this subject (Gruber & Saez, 2002). The corresponding elasticity of broad income is 0.475.
with Joel Slemrod
International Tax and Public Finance, 2012
Empirical research about tax evasion and the informal economy has exploded in the past few decades, seeking to shed light on the magnitude and (especially policy) determinants of these phenomena. Quantitative information informs the analysis of policy choices, enables the testing of hypotheses about determinants of this phenomenon, and can help with the accurate construction of national income accounts. Even as empirical analysis has burgeoned, some have expressed doubts about the quality and usefulness of some prominent measures. The fact that high-quality data is elusive is neither surprising nor a coincidence. The defining characteristic of tax evasion and informal economic activity—that they are generally illegal—often renders unreliable standard data collection methods such as surveys. Unlike invisible phenomena in the natural sciences, these invisible social science phenomena are hard to measure because of choices made by individuals. Analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy must proceed even in the absence of the direct observability of key variables, and theory should guide the construction and interpretation of evidence of the “invisible.” In this paper, we address what can be learned using micro or macro data regarding tax evasion and the informal economy under given conditions and assumptions, and critically review some of the most common empirical methods in light of our conclusions. We conclude with an entreaty for researchers in this field to enlist in the “credibility revolution” (Angrist and Pischke in J. Econ. Perspect. 4(2):3–30, 2010) in applied econometrics.
Handbook Chapters
with Ben Hansen & Keaton Miller
Handbook for Labor, Human Resources, and Population Economics, 2021
Legal access to recreational cannabis continues to expand across the globe. With each new market comes new legal structures and regulations. In this chapter we first review the regulations and market structures of the newly legalized recreational markets in the United States, Canada, and Uruguay. We then discuss the emerging literature on the industrial organization of the cannabis industry, which provides new evidence on market competition and the price elasticity of demand. We proceed to review the expanding research on cannabis taxation and the black market. This research has meaningful public policy conclusions for how tax rates and structures affect revenue generation and the black market, key arguments for legalization. We finish by reviewing the public health literature on legalization, and its findings on how legalization has affected cannabis use, dangerous driving, and the use and abuse of other drugs.
Working Papers
with Laura Kawano & Andrew Whitten
with Christian Imboden & John Voorheis